sors write for the approval of their new peers in the humanities.5 Professors Kahn and White reside in the last category.
Ignoring the fracas and obsessed with self, professors gleefully keep churning out the unconnected fluff and more journals surface to absorb it, while critics seethe with frustration.6 Criticism has been en riched with two new insights -and challenges. James Boyd White7 of Michigan Law School seeks salvation in the use of the literary imagi nation to transform and elevate our vision of law. Paul W. Kahn8 of Yale Law School proffers an even more dramatic solution: stop the presses -scholar heal thyself.
Legal scholars are, according to Kahn, like squirrels on a treadmill: they energetically run and run but never go anywhere. We don't know why the squirrels run, but Kahn knows what motivates legal scholars to engage the treadmill -it's the Holy Grail of reform. Why? Re form is always necessary. It presents the tempting challenge of an abyss -a bottomless pit of constant failure on a highway of flawed solutions, a road kill that attracts law professors like stink on dung (pp. 7-8).
For Kahn, reform is the inevitable product of the interaction of reason and will. Reason guides the rule of law with rational restraint, analytical deliberation, and logical critique. " [W] e consent to law be cause it is reasonable" (p. 10). But reason is an empty gesture without popular will, which is necessary to convince the citizenry to consent to the wisdom of reason. Most of the time this is what in fact occurs, and the two effectively "work together to create an almost impregnable redoubt for the rule of law as our deepest cultural commitment" (p. 13). There are, however, times where one of the institutions serves to rationalize deficiencies in the other. For example, the lack of popular support for a government regulation may be overcome by resort to reason, while the irrational may be tolerated by the consent of popular will (p. 13).
As Kahn points out, the commitment to use reason to build popu lar will/consent prompts professors to dedicate careers to producing reform scholarship. Much of the scholarly focus is devoted to recon- (Vol. 98 :150 4 citing reason and will in judicial review where courts use reason to de velop principles to "obtain the consent of the popular will" (p. 14). Likewise, the use of reason to critique existing laws always turns up glitches and friction, inviting suggestions of corrective reform. Kahn sums up the source of the scholarly motivation: "The rule of law ... is not merely rule under the existing law; it is this whole process of con tinuous reform" (p. 15).
Juggling reason and will and a virulent addiction to reform scholar ship is not the only problem. Instead of functioning as true scholars with impartiality, law professors write as practitioners of reform. They imitate judges by writing article-briefs in the doctrinal form of judicial opinions. They seek to make law work. To Kahn, this reflects the "collapse" of a distinction between the scholar and the object of his study (p. 7). The scholar is in effect the judge manque. All article briefs follow the same plot: identify a defect in an opinion's reasoning, devise a rationale for reform, and write a new decision-article (p. 28). The inevitable result is a continuous process of classical doctrinalism.9
It is not that Kahn completely condemns reform scholarship, but he does argue that an obsessive interest and disquietude with the topic diverts inquiry into more relevant areas and satisfactory results. Judge manque scholarship gives a misleading impression that judicial deci sions convey power. In reality, judges mainly speak to the practicali ties of achieving an end without ever defining that end. Even the Supreme Court cannot set an agenda for the ends of governance. Brown v. Board of Education,10 arguably the most important judicial decision in history, has had modest effects on society, race, and gov ernance (p. 132). Kahn's explanation: "They never had the power; they always lacked the will " (p. 133).
Given the existence of a multitude of complex forces that impact and shape the compass and motivation of judicial power, scholars are wasting time seeking "right" answers when they aren't there or are mute. 11 Kahn's solution: shift the scholarly focus to new sources by 10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) . 11. If we are confident that we are better off after the judicial pronouncement, this is only because we are already committed to a court-centered world in which we evaluate power by looking to the quality of authoritative decisions. If we believe that there are right answers under law and that law has a value in and of itself, then we will argue about the legally cor rect answers that the Court should reach. This is what most legal scholarship is about. But if judicial decisions do not translate into effective results in the larger political order, then legal correctness may not be much of a value. Getting the law right may not tell us much about the character of the political order.
"looking at the legal imagination" (p. 135). Study the varied contin gencies and the context of law's culture, its indeterminacies, and influ ences on it from the "inheritance of remnants from antiquated belief systems, brought into a loose coherence by virtue of certain master conceptions-e.g., sovereignty, revolution, equality" (p. 137).
THE CULTURAL WAR
Kahn's crusade continues the law academy's paranoid relationship with scholarship. In distancing himself from the reason-will-reform paradigm, he implicitly acknowledges a sense of doubt as to whether law is worthy of serious scholarship. The effort to elevate the scholar above the "practice of law" states the source of the paranoia: the practice of law is a vocation -something like digging ditches or plumbing -and cannot support any attention other than descriptive survey, that is, an explication of what lawyers do, why they do it, and suggestions for improvement (reform).
The scholarship paranoia can be traced to Langdell's admission of law as a vocation by his effort to create a science of law by sequencing cases to form the basis for the deductions of legal principles. "Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines."1 2 In objectifying law he rationalized the doctrinal method of scholarship that conforms to Kahn's paradigm -decisions are parsed and synthe sized to derive prescriptions to guide judges and lawyers. The objec tive is problem solving.
The dominance of doctrinalism was assured when the law review network evolved to showcase faculty scholarship. As an editor for the Harvard Law Review, John Henry Wigmore said: "We knew that their pioneer work in legal education was not yet but ought to be well appreciated by the profession. We yearned to see the fruits of their scholarship in print."1 3 It opened up a unique system that ignores the discipline of peer review thereby depositing virtual control over sub stance and methodology in the author.
The first major threat to doctrinalism came from the legal realists who questioned the credibility of the notion that "science" defines le gal analysis. Kahn detects realism's failure as a movement in its ad herence to the reason-will-reform paradigm, thereby remaining "firmly within the grip of legal practice" (p. 24). Once the realist threat dissipated, doctrinalism flourished, enabling faculty to reap fi-nancial rewards and status from being perceived as producing a form of scientific analysis. 14 In his zest to save legal scholarship from self-destruction, Kahn conveniently opts to ignore the cultural war that engulfed legal schol arship in the 1980s. When law school enrollment dramatically in creased in the early '80s, it signaled more than the brain drain about which Derek Bok complained.1 5 It provoked the hiring of a new group of young faculty who entered the academy with a new vision. They questioned, to the point of resentment, the rigidity and authoritarian ism of the system that produced them. The newcomers included femi nists who had their own score to settle. Not only did both groups share a desire for change, they also had more in common with their colleagues in the humanities than with the doctrinally oriented law school faculty. They became Tenured Radicals, and as Crits (Critical Legal Studies) and Fem Crits, they became instigators of a new cul ture.
In the meantime, the postmodern revolution exploited its domi nance of the humanities to gain control of the university community. The quest for truth succumbed to relativism while emotion trumped objectivity as the interpretation of the text became a game of trans gressing and demystifying. Postmodern language never escapes from its duplicity and confusion. Led by Tenured Radicals, the once autonomous law schools joined the crusade of chaos. The values that defined the Langdellian paradigm of scientific analysis were swept away, leaving a dwindling group of liberal law professors, along with a few holdouts in the sciences, to stand guard as the last keepers of the old traditions. To make things worse, they had to fight off both Tenured Radicals and incoming students who had been conditioned to postmodernism in their undergraduate experiences.
Although he recognizes Critical Legal Studies' hostility to the lib eral system, Kahn dismisses the Crits as failed reformers. They got too radical -"[s]uch radicalness makes this scholarship seem oddly naive" -and became irrelevant "because no one was listening" (p. 15. Harvard University President Bok claimed that the "brain drain" into law schools is "a massive diversion of exceptional talent into pursuits that often add little to the growth of the economy, the pursuit of culture, the enhancement of the human spirit." Jethro K.
Lieberman & Tom Goldstein, Why Ha ve Lawyers Proliferated?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1986, atA27.
dead as a doornail."16 Crits made a practice of drawing attention to various problems but never followed up with solutions. As Professor Gordon observed, after an exercise in shoveling rhetorical smoke, Kennedy and his friends "zoom[ ed] off in their BMWs and Jaguars to continue their class struggle against hierarchy and privilege."17 The reason they failed at reform was simple -it was never their goal. But they did what they set out to do -wage an all-out cultural revolution against the liberal rule of law.
It was the Crits who introduced postmodernism to the law acad emy with a tactic now commonly known as trashing. Communicated in a helter-skelter postmodern pitch, trashing is in-your-face jive and chatter used to ridicule and deconstruct liberal symbols and institu tions.18 Crits conducted a radical political campaign to break down the law academy's infrastructure of objectivity, neutrality, and rationality -and ultimately subvert the individualistic, biased rule of law. and the State as an imaginary political community composed of a "se quence of images forming a kind of dream-like narrative that mystifies and idealizes the painful reality of immediate social experience -the real experience corroded by alienation and mutual distance."25
Kahn also views the feminist movement as reformist and, like CLS, as "in thrall to the idea that reason and will are the double sources of the rule of law" (p. 24). There is no doubt that feminists talk a rights game, and it was the Crit's refusal to support their reform aspirations that led to a break between the groups -with the Crits the losers.26 But that was before the postmodern vision had the opportunity to be come a major factor in revising feminist rhetoric. Equality by itself is not sufficient to root out the residual effects of patriarchy and the tyr anny of reason. What is needed, according to many contemporary feminists, is a postmodern worldview of reality as a mask for the unor dered and holistic solutions that come from feeling and empathy.27
A postmodern dialect enables female legal scholars to produce shock trashing to discredit and break down the coherence of the con structed categories and classifications used by the dominant legal ide ology to oppress women. Fictional social constructions, like male, female, heterosexual, homosexual, and lesbian, in actuality blur into a continuum. In her controversial postmodern declaration, Mary Joe Frug described in graphic detail the female body existing in a state of constant terror, shocked the readers with the "F" and "C" words, while praising postmodernism for encouraging "wordplay that is often dazzlingly funny, smart, and irreverent. Things aren't just what they seem" ; 28 that is, things aren't what they seem in a liberal, politically constructed, dominant culture.
The most energetic opposition to the culture of reason comes from the "voice" movement. As females and people of color, writers in this tradition voice the unique and distinct perceptions and experiences of outsiders coping with liberal majoritarian law. Voice people challenge doctrinalism with a new paradigm ; they use narratives, parodies, and parables to produce authentic and exclusive accounts of alienation and victimhood.29 Voice comes to the table with formidable leverage. It is marketed as a Kuhnian paradigm change, a new genre of scholarship vetting race and gender. 30 The race and gender orientation tends to mute negative responses. Moreover, the biographical context of narrative stories makes them virtually immune to critical evaluation. 31 Negative criticism merely validates the authenticity of the author's description of victimization. "How can you respond critically? Tell a different story of your own?" 32 Finally, by converting truth into whatever the author decrees, storytelling introduces into legal scholarship a post modern self that defies consensus. 33
While the voice medium delivers a message, it is not the message. Th e message of Critical Race Theory scholarship is that the. liberal, white, male rule of law and the system it maintains are corrupt. This system is an institution predicated on white supremacy, immune to re form, and destined for catastrophe. Derrick Bell uses the voice thesis in a parable about an economically besieged United States accepting an offer from aliens to exchange Blacks for gold and critical chemi cals. 34 In another Bell allegory, it takes an explosion killing all Black faculty and administration at Harvard to force an affirmative action hiring policy. 35 Even when the white system makes a concession, it will invariably tum out to be a trick to camouflage some new form of oppression. While Patricia Williams tells stories about persevering in a racist society, 36 Richard Delgado's narratives blame Western men- tality for unleashing "a ruthless, restless culture"37 that enslaves people of color.
To Kahn, reform means superficial tinkering -revising process and procedure, courts expanding or contracting rights as professors gleefully and self-righteously chum out critique scholarship. While the Crits cravenly demurred from the revolution, the Tenured Radicals of feminism and the voice people participated in rights advo cacy, but only as a support tactic for their main objective -a para digm change from the liberal culture of reason and rationality to the indeterminacy of the postmodern culture. Like Kahn, they seek a new culture. Unlike Kahn, they are in the process of achieving their goal.
KAHN AS A P OSTMODERNIST
Kahn's evasion of the postmodern paradigm change challenge is explained when he outlines his cultural study of law. His creation of what I call the Ideal Legal Scholar avoids contamination from the practice of law by engaging in a Socratic dialogue that enables him to temporarily suspend belief in law practice. By transcending "every context" of the practice of law, the scholar is free "to examine the conditions of belief that make possible our ordinary activities and norms" (p. 33), enabling him to discover postmodern insights: imagi nation prevails over reason, law is always contingent, 38 avoid making normative judgments, and seek out self so "[w]e can know more about ourselves" (p. 40).
As the central nervous system of certainty, truth is anathema to postmodernism. 39 In assuming that truth interferes with the work of the Ideal Scholar in his cultural inquiry, Kahn implicitly endorses postmodernism. To the Ideal Scholar, truth is inevitably qualified and contested, existing as an attitude or the product of imagination. "Like every constructed world, the critical world exists only as long as we imagine it" (p. 40).
A rejection of truth and certainty does not inhibit Kahn from giv ing the Ideal Scholar a detailed macromap for the cultural survey. The map calls for the use of what Kahn calls "genealogy" and "architec- 38. "Understanding the constructed character of the rule of law allows us to see its con tingent character and to understand that law's claim upon us is not a product of law's truth but of our own imagination -our imagining its meanings and our failure to imagine alterna tives." P. 39. 39. What is striking is precisely the degree of consensus in postmodernist discourse that there is no longer any possibility of consensus, the authoritative announcements of the dis appearance of final authority and the promotion and recirculation of a total and comprehen sive narrative of a cultural condition in which totality is no longer thinkable.
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ture" to uncover a "legal aesthetic" (pp. 40-41). Genealogy traces the remnants -implications -of cultural transitions, to etch out a narra tive of beliefs. Architecture relies on analogy to show that in law the past always exists in the present. "The point of legal interpretation is always to recover, i.e., to make present, something that appears al ready to exist" (p. 52). Unlike science, in which progress destroys the past, in law nothing is ever displaced. "All law remains available at every moment" (p. 54).
By giving the past continuity, Kahn compels the Ideal Scholar to consider the consequences of relevant transitions, especially those as sociated with religion and revolution. Pass a law, lock someone in jail, or write a brief, and it resonates with the authority of Moses descend ing from the Mount with God's law. Law "is simultaneously a product and a continuing representation of the divine origins of the commu nity" (p. 47). Revolution breaks out, law ends, but "[w]ithout revolu tion, law does not begin" (p. 69), as each validates the other.
Pondering the indeterminacy of religion and conjecturing over the remnants of political transitions provide the perfect pursuit for the postmodern scholar.
Law as imagination and fiction have a Derridaian bite that resonates in the gamesmanship ploys of the fac ulty lounge. But Kahn leaves postmodern abstractions to micro manage and in the process puts his Ideal Scholar in an awkward bind.
According to Kahn, every institution can make representation claims, often leading to multiple or competing claims. For example, both judge and jury can claim to represent the popular sovereign, forcing what Kahn calls a "contest" with enormous implications. If the jury is speaking for the people as representative of the popular sovereign, jury nullification would "appear permissible because it is understood as a direct action by the people" (p. 80). But if it is the court that can claim sovereign representation, nullification would con stitute an inappropriate usurpation of power. "The judge can claim to know the law and, through law, to know the sovereign people better than any accidental collection of persons on a jury" (p. 80).
At this point the Ideal Scholar faces a dilemma. Bound by Kahn's ukase to avoid the trenches of reform, the Scholar's work is at an end. He has identified the intersection between the institutions and the competing representation claims but can do no more than note their contingent existence; he cannot, as a postmodernist, make a judgment on a "correct" claim of representation, but instead, he "explores the multiple possibilities of representational claims" (p. 78). Here is the dilemma. Stopping at this point is a counterintuitive inhibition for se rious scholars: it cuts against the moral obligation, inherent in the scholarly ethic, to carry inquiry to a conclusion -whatever the conse quences. Ironically, Kahn illustrates the dilemma by being unable to refrain from making a judgment: while jury nullification is generally "flawed justice," it may be appropriate in certain situations, such as charges of euthanasia (p. 81). Kahn's relativistic cultural analysis col lapses.
The explanation for Kahn's vigorous stand for cultural scholarship comes in four "methodological rules" whose intent is to render practi cal scholarship either superfluous or officious. The rules come in two strands: first, every meaning in law is contingent. Even the source of power, the judge, exists as a contingency-either as a suppressed self in which he conveys a rule of law image, or, in the alternative, sup pressing the law image to become a political figure (e.g. Chief Justice Earl Warren) (p .. 101 .
). In law, progress is a myth, and there are no successes or failures, resulting in persistent competition among mean ings. Reform under these conditions is thus a meaningless ephem eron. "In the absence of a hierarchy of norms, no program of reform can silence alternatives" (p. 104).
Secondly, law is not "a failed form of something other than itself" (p. 92), and it is not something in transition. " [L] aw is a set of mean ings by which we live -and that is all that it is" (p. 102). Practical scholars like Richard Posner can effect a type of change that never impacts on the rule of law -which existed before and will exist after Posner's reform. Moreover, debates among practical scholars result in "balancing" and political compromises internal to the rule of law. The failure or success of the reform does not affect the nation's faith in law's rule, "which dates from the founding" (p. 105).
Kahn says that he does not seek the demise of reform scholarship -instead he suggests the use of some restraint to tone down the rhetoric and expectations. Nor should the Ideal Scholar subvert the practical work of traditional scholarship (p. 137). These protestations cannot smokescreen his contempt for the practical scholar's waste of energy on unproductive goals. Arguing about the interplay of reason and will and how the authoritative sovereign should govern detours the practical scholar to spurious claims on the authority and power of the judiciary, wasting resources best devoted to "the character of the study of law" (p. 135). Kahn cautions that, while courts can tell us which side of the road to drive on, they do not have the authority to affect the vital factors of governance. "Courts can draw our attention to the aberrational, i.e., to remnants of social practices that we have otherwise abandoned, but they cannot make us other than we are" (p. 130). Dedication to reform analysis hides the reality that courts have marginal effect on societal outcomes.
Kahn's message is that writing about what should be done and ar guing over which Justice's opinion is "correct" may be a self-serving path to academic status but is a waste of time for discovering the im plications of legal culture. He wants the Ideal Scholar to follow the cultural inquiry to the source of "real power" that "inheres in our ex pectations and beliefs, in the institutional structures that we take for granted, and in countless, mundane daily choices" (p. 132). The objec-tive: redefine and reorient the character of the study of law by exam ining the legal imagination, a concept that covers the full range of ex periences such as the impact of sexuality and the implication of the body. "The cultural study of law investigates a way of life in all its di versity, not just those objects and practices positively labeled 'law' " (p. 125).
Kahn leaves no doubt that it is a religious meaning that inspires the imagination of the Ideal Scholar. Even violence can be understood by reference to religion. To connect law and violence, one must under stand that sacrifice is an act of violence that transforms ideas into re ality. Kahn cites Abraham's sacrifice of his only son Isaac in exchange for a nation under law (p. 95). Where there is no divine response, sac rifice is meaningless violence. Kahn's cultural inquiry demonstrates that violence can best be understood as a meaningful factor in the le gal imagination -not as an act of failure or a mistake implying "that somehow we have a world that we did not intend to have" (p. 97).
L AW AND L ITERATURE
"To understand the rule of law we must examine that which we imagine to be other than law" (Kahn, p. 120).
"A cultural approach sees that all of law's texts, including those of the legal scholar, are works of fiction" (Kahn, p. 139).
Kahn is preaching a version of postmodernism to a sympathetic audience of feminists, critical race people, and Tenured Radicals. He can also count on support from elements of the law and literature group. While Kahn correctly characterizes law and banana efforts 40 (for example, law and psychology, sociology, economics, etc.) as "se curely within the practice of law, regardless of their letterhead" (p. 26), the literature movement has diverse letterheads, along with an eclectic range of uses and effects, including Professor White's use of literature to postmodernize law. Using "good" literature to teach writing skills obviously comes under a law practice characterization called remedial education. We get a blurred letterhead from an ex atnination . of William Faulkner's Intruder in the Dust,41 which discloses multiple meanings on the intersection of race, violence, maturation, and law.4 2 There is no blurring of meaning or intention, however, when Robin [Vol. 98 :1504 West uses a Franz Kafka short story, A Hunger Artist,43 to trash Rich ard Posner's world of economic individualism. By selling admission to people to witness him starving to death, the Hunger Artist is the "ul timate Posnerian entrepreneur,"4 4 dedicated to the corrupting indi vidualism of a capitalist market economy. West interprets the story to depict a Posnerian system that "leaves all preferences satiated at every moment of autonomous choice"4 5 and refuses to intervene in social and economic dislocations.
Posner disputes the accuracy of West's interpretation of Kafka,46 thereby missing the point. It is not a matter of interpretative transla tion; West incorporates Kahn's notion of "other than law" and culture as "fiction" to derive a description of the oppressive effects of an eco nomic system driven to solve every problem -from adoption to vio lence -by resort to free market exchange. West's pretension thus demonstrates the affinity between Kahn's culture of imagination and the use of literature to explicate. While literature has always inter acted with law, it has generally been as background presence. Years ago, for example, it was common practice to provide incoming stu dents with a list of "recommended" literary icons that would present insights into the profession. In the postmodern era, law and literature has become a featured attraction.47 Teaching Virginia Wolfe, Dick Gregory, and Marcel Proust gave Tenured Radicals an opportunity to demonstrate disdain for objectivity, try new critical theories, and of fend the Kingsfields of the Academy. More literature courses were added to respond to demands for exposure to feminist work. What ever the motivating currents, the movement bears the imprint of James Boyd White, who got things going in Th e Legal Im agination (1973) , does not read literature to fact monger, to gain clues to character, or to learn methods of critical interpretation. Likewise, White rejects lit erature as constituting a road map to rhetorical flourishes and strata gems for getting an edge in litigation. Instead, the Ideal Reader en gages the text "to transform one's sense of language, of the mind, and of the world" (p. 56). The objective is to exploit the power of reading in a performance that enables us to recognize experiences beyond self.
What the habitual reading of literature offers, then, is not a set of propo sitions or a method leading to a set of results, but the experience of di recting one's attention to a plane or dimension of reality that is noJ1l1ally difficult or impossible to focus upon, namely the ethical and linguistic plane, where we remake in our texts both our languages and ourselves.
To the literary mind language is not simply transparent, a way of talking about obj ects or concepts in the world, but is itself a part of the world; language is not simply an instrument that "I" use in communicating ideas to "you" but a way in which I am, or make myself, in relation to you. [p.
]
Kahn wants to rehabilitate the legal scholar through imagination of self and other in conceiving the rule of law; White wants to rehabili tate the law student through exposure to the literary imagination, ul timately transforming the student into an Ideal Reader with the in stincts of an Ideal Scholar. He begins by having students examine nonlegal texts to identify voices and discourse that legal expressions omit. The next step is to learn -and appreciate -how nonlegal authors transform language. Then comes a critical internal dialogue; a student is ordered to conjure up an experience such as the death of a friend, the character of another person, regulation of conduct, and "think" about it, first as a lawyer, and then "in some other way avail able to her, as she might do in the rest of life" (p. 74). In the ensuing dialogue, a comparison emerges in which the law discourse comes across as artificial, lifeless, and packed with objectified, analytical ri gidity.
White initially assumed that the comparison would compel the student to begin to doubt his choice of law as a career and, as a coun ter, to develop a creative alternative to the law voice. That is not what happened -instead students relied on the voice they had successfully used in undergraduate school, a voice as vacuous as lawspeak. The re sult is frustration: "[T]he student finds himself using two voices, both of which are unsatisfactory to him" (p. 75).
The remedy for this face-off is literary imagination. Using the en ergy from literature, students learn to speak in a new voice that en ables them to produce more inspired law work as well as discoursing in a personal voice of their own. They become Ideal Readers. The power of nonlegal voices informs the student, "establishing possibili ties to admire, or in some cases deplore, that may help us investigate how this life can be led well" (p. 78).
[Vol. 98:1504 White describes a postmodern version of basic training: take young, na'ive recruits, pound into their pliable psyches how futile their pitiable existence as civilians was, then inculcate them with the combat techniques of a more fulfillin g life. Like my old top sergeant who opened up every day by looking me up and down before advising me that "if that's ed-a-cation, I don't want none of it" (he was the best professor I've ever had), White seeks to convince law students that lawspeak is unworthy, stunted, and that they are in need of redemp tion through literature. Darkness at No on49 comes to law school.
In a typical drill session from The Legal Im agination, White orders the student recruits to read an excerpt from Th e Education of Henry Adams,50 reminds them of Joseph Conrad's quitting the sea to become a writer -"Why on earth did he do so ... ?," asks a series of ques tions, orders them to "express the real you," "[t]hink now of your rela tions with others," " [c] onsider what you do when a friend suffers,"5 1 and on and on. The message is clear: develop a voice of empathy and compassion or remain condemned to lawspeak.
Even in the congenial milieu of a writer's workshop or the speciali zation of an English major, the conversion White seeks is problematic. Acquiring the temperament or self that he envisions involves a per sonal journey, demanding serious maturation and considerable sacri fice. As an undergraduate I took over thirty hours of lit courses and never encountered the type of highly programm ed badgering that White throws at his students. I experienced passion rather then pro gramming. If I accessed a new voice, it did not come from classroom badgering but from the opportunity to hear William Faulkner discuss the creative process. 52 He was "a tricky man, not above playing, how ever courteously, with his audience,"5 3 but he was open to the creative process. There is another problem: White eschews the use of litera ture to teach style yet promotes a drill program force-feeding students with demands for copious drafts, conveying the message that style is in fact the objective -why else engage in the ennui of drafting exer cises? Blotner eds., 1959) .
The harshest criticism of White's work comes from Judge Richard Posner, who first raised the issue of relevance in a law review article s4 followed by a book.ss He rejects the assumption that literature can furnish unique insights into law or that lawyers, as lawyers, can con tribute to the understanding of literature. Literature may reference law, but law is not the central story. "There are better places to learn about law than novels .... "s6 Moreover, White's literary musing re flects nonlegal interest and training, not legal skills. .Posner debunks what he calls the "great false hope" : that literature can inform lawyers about interpretative knowledge, which can help in extracting meaning from text. To Posner, the great false hope masks a post-structuralist ploy that would equate legal interpretation with a system of literary interpretation that replaces the author's authority over meaning with the authority of reader-critics. "[T]he readers have now overthrown the bosses and installed themselves in power."s7 Without the direction of the author's intention, reader-critics have total control over mean ing, leading to a system where there can be as many "correct" inter pretations as reader-critics. Posner's distinction is that literary people can get away with poetic license but not judges who have the respon sibility to impose their will on the public. Posner concludes: "the functions of legislation and literature are so different, and the objec tives of the readers of these two different sorts of mental product so divergent, that the principles and approaches developed for the one have no useful application to the other. "ss If literary imagination becomes the springboard for legal interpre tation, it is Paradise Lost for Posner and his liberal colleagues. His 1986 article described an interpretative attitude that defined the then dominant liberal tradition.s9 If he had put his ear to the railroad tracks, he would have heard ominous vibrations. Postmodernism was beginning to filter into the law academy, fillin g a leadership void left by disconnected and aloof liberals who were blind to, or intimidated by, the aggressive tactics of Tenured Radicals. The Radicals consti tute a group of people who, as the Yale Law School dean said, care more about the humanities than law.60 By the early 1990s the post-· 58. Posner, supra note 54, at 1374.
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60. Former Dean Wellington was credited with the complaint that "law professors today are more concerned with intellectual currents among their colleagues in the arts and sciences (Vol. 98 :1504 modem influence had infiltrated the American Association of Law Schools, which decreed "nontraditional" (read postmodern) scholar ship acceptable for promotion and tenure. 6 1 But give Posner credit for ferreting out what White and the postmodernist were after -the use of the literary imagination to distill objectivity and the Posnerian eco nomic model from law.
Two years after Posner's book came out, White pounced like an offended Norman Mailer going after Gore Vidal . He started by can didly acknowledging, "I agree with virtually nothing that is said .. . . "6 2 He accused Posner of a hidden agenda; what is offered as an examina tion of literature is in reality a Langdellian legal brief stacked with co ercive arguments and propositions that fail to "engage" (one of White's favorite words) the texts he seeks to explain. 6 3 Compiling facts and identifying issues, Posner treats texts as if they were legal precedent. He gets the ultimate put-down -he is an anti-intellectual who speaks in an academic-lawyer-economist voice that "prevents him from seeing in the texts he studies the most important part of their meaning." 64 Posner is not an Ideal Reader.
White's main criticism is that Posner suffers from an inability to "engage" -or connect -to text and that that is a deficiency that compels him to force the judgment that literature has nothing to say about extracting meaning from authoritative legal texts. 6 5 Othenvise he could divine the message that uncovering original intention is nei ther linear nor a function of marginal cost but comes from the use of the literary imagination -it is, in other words, an art. 66 From expec tation to experience, White invokes the translator's analogy: every textual translation adds something that was not in the original or omits something that was. To demonstrate how the translation process works, White has students translate "All men are created equal" into a foreign language of their choice. "The results are astonishing: in some languages, such as Korean or Chinese, my students report that the sentence they produce is simply incoherent or unintelligible" (p. 85).
The analogy is that the lawyer-artist, in reading the authoritative text to extract a meaning for application in a new context, will neces sarily add and omit.67 The ascertainment of a static and immutable original meaning is, under the translator's analogy, impossible and a dangerous assumption. This does not mean, as Posner argues, that the lawyer-artist is empowered with the unbridled discretion to pick meaning out of the air with Derridaian insouciance. The lawyer-artist is always restrained by an obligation of fidelity to the original text. "The lawyer is thus a kind of translator, a writer who necessarily re makes an original text but always under the obligation to do it jus tice. "68
Postmodernism endorses language lacunae: obscurantism to mask substantive confusion or vacuity.69 Posner complained that he had dif ficulty following White's exhortative abstract discourse.70 Unques tionably White has an affini ty for language lacunae -in part attribut able to the material in which he trades. He is essentially an English professor who crusades in the law academy and understandably lapses into rhetorical enrichment deemed fashionable in an English depart ment. Then too, like Kahn, he is a postmodernist, and that's how they talk. The problem for outsiders is cutting through the rhetorical stratagems to ascertain if there is a hidden agenda.
White's translator analogy requires some serious cutting. He uses the analogy to demonstrate that intentionalism is a sham because original intent defies identification. While translation produces "a kind of relativism" (p. 84), White claims that it never dissolves into deconstruction. The "good lawyer" and the "good judge," who pro duce the ideal interpretation for a given context, can bypass the abyss of deconstruction (p. 85), where there is no fixed meaning of a text, 70. See Posner, supra note 54, at 1392 ("[White's] writings on law and literature contain much on literature, but little on law beyond exhortation to lawyers and judges to be more sensitive, candid, empathetic, imaginative, and humane. The exhortation is timely and elo quent; but what exactly White envisages for law as a humanity I do not know. His most re cent effort to explain what he means is pitched at so high a level of abstraction that I have lost the thread of his discourse.").
[Vol. 98:1504 except in the experience of the reader "and that experience is immedi ately compromised the moment you say something about it."7 1
In a search for the ideal interpretation, how does the "good judge" overcome the relativism of the translator's analogy? Easy : he engages in "a perpetual negotiation between the self and the world, including other people" (p. 87), learns what they say or do, looks to other lan guages, values, and cultures, while comparing the judge's own lan guage with others. It is like reading an Alan Greenspan transcript; you know he is making a point, but you're not sure what it is. Like Greenspan usually does, White reveals the point at the end : "There are no right answers here, but a conversation all the terms of which are tentative or uncertain" (p. 87). Here is the hidden agenda : the "good judge" and the "good lawyer" are, in fact, contrary to White's assertions, engaging in deconstruction. Like Paul de Man, the "good judge" knows that language never escapes "from the duplicity, the confusion, the untruth that we take for granted in the everyday use of language. "72
Professor Kahn tells us, "The power of irony extends everywhere" (p. 76), presumably even touching White, Paul de Man, and decon struction. White rejects deconstruction for going too far by denying the possibility of any meaning. 7
3 He exaggerates the range of decon struction; meaning exists but only for an instant, it is constantly de fined and refined, never finalized, and always subject to the trace of previous and subsequent words.7 4 For the literary critic there is a more compelling reason for staying away from deconstruction -it is de classe. Once the chic literary -and law 7 5 -fashion, it self-destructed from the excesses of Jacques Derrida, 76the debacle of the Fish Bowl at Duke, 77 Both Kahn and White vehemently urge the absence of correct in terpretation -truth is invariably contingent, incorporating traces of the past and future. "The idea," White says, "is to undermine the as sumption that words 'have' meanings, and suggest instead that they have potential for. meanings of many kinds."80 White's translation analogy automatically generates static -meanings omitted or added -that renders interpretation problematic. The designation of a "good lawyer" and a "good judge" with commitments to "justice" is an open-ended invitation for context-dictated value judgement, and is subject to Posner's wrath for cutting "himself loose from moorings that are part of the fundamental design of American government."81 EDWARDS VS. WIDTE First came the postmodernistic scholarship -then came the criti cal reaction. The most dramatic criticism came from Judge Harry T. Edwards of the D.C. Court of Appeals and former Michigan law pro fessor who got the academy's attention by charging that professors at elite schools were imitating the arts and sciences with rogue scholar ship.82 He labeled them ivy tower dilettantes who, as "' impractical' scholars,"83 produce abstract theory unconnected to law. With a dedi cation to indeterminacy, Critical Legal Studies falls in the impractical category, while law and economics, with flights in abstraction, exem- [Vol. 98 :1504 plifies the irrelevance of theory. As for law and literature, Edwards tosses it aside as making no practical contribution -it "simply de scribes certain texts."84
With indignant flair, the Judge took the debate to a different venue; while Posner focused his criticisms on literature, Edwards in dicted the spread of the postmodern culture into legal educationand even into practice. It was a venue that gave White an opportunity to reprint an article presenting a richer and more encompassing justifi cation for his literary imagination (pp. 43-51 ).
According to White, scholarship is more complicated than Edwards's misleading dichotomy between the practical and the theo retical. White contends that everything starts with the law school mis sion, which should not teach task assigning, present "right" or "wrong" choices, or burden students with the acquisition of skills. The objective is expansion: learning one's mode of thought, engaging in self-criticism, and making choices "under conditions of radical uncer tainty" (p. 47). It is a matter of translating from other fields, testing the language of one field against that of another. The mission is to teach "responsibility for the operations of one's own mind" (p. 47).
White thus "engages" Edwards by converting his complaint against scholar dilettantes into a cultural issue and responds by invoking the vision of the literary imagination. When Edwards complains about the lack of ethical training in the law academy,85 White blames it on a tun nel-vision devotion to teaching the practical skills of mechanical juris prudence (p. 45). The solution is cultural; ethics comes from the holis tic inspiration of the transformative effects of the literary imagination, which induces respect for others and for what lawyers and judges do. Law school should teach "responsibility for the operations of one's own mind, and for the judgments one reaches; responsibility to the law itself' (p. 47).
The inclusive range of a holistic education is not unlimited and un conditional. While White would tolerate the participation of the social sciences, they embrace "tendencies of a different kind" (p. 51), that threaten the academy. Because of the seriousness of the threatwhich we can assume comes principally from Posner and the law and economics gang -he advocates a more vigorous defense against the "tendencies of a different kind" than is presently being displayed. "It is possible that the defense will fail, and law as we know it will disap pear, which I would regard as a tragedy beyond contemplation" (p.
51).
White thus uses the literary imagination to cast law and economics as a threat to convert legal education into a monster of objectivity, in- White sees a Kafka metamorphosis in every classroom, morphing stu dents into Ivan Boeskys. 87 There is a threat, but it comes from the balkanization of legal education into a law versus banana squabble be tween the traditionalists and younger Tenured Radicals. Here is more of Kahn's ubiquitous irony: as proponents of banana disciplines, White and Posner are bound together in a common cause of survival.
It was Posner as professor who broke the door down for the accep tance of bananas. While there had been modest cross-fertilization with the social sciences, the appearance of law and economics sparked a revolution. An article in the Wall Street Journal reported it as "the most important thing in legal education since the birth of Harvard Law School. "88 As a progeny of the Chicago School of Economics, and with the sponsorship of the University of Chicago Law School, the movement overcame strong opposition to become a curricular fixture. The long-range consequence is that Posner and his zealous followers made all bananas respectable, prompting the New York Times to ask: Wh at do Law Schools Teach? Almost Anything.89
Edwards does not advocate the total exclusion of theory; rather he concedes that, in moderation, exposure to nonlaw fields could provide valuable insights. To him, the threat comes from volume; the weight of the banana invasion has converted the curriculum into a graduate school of social science and humanities.9 0 In a 1998 essay Peter H.
Schuck of Yale Law School agreed with Edwards on the split between practice and education but discounted its effects. "It poses no serious problems ... and it can be reduced but never bridged completely, which in my view is fortunate for both sides. "9 1 For support, he cites a study purporting to show no significant change in the quality and It is not that his data is flawed -it is simply dated and therefore irrelevant. An economist would call it a case of "creative destruction": it was not until the mid-to late 1980s that the postmodern movement tripped in with sufficient influence to "creatively" usurp control of the legal education market from the liberals. Roll Over Beethoven,93 the Crit manifesto, was published in 1984, and storytelling, the Critical Race trademark, got a jump Start in 1989 from a Michigan Law Review symposium,94 while the Harvard Law Review published Frug's post modern manifesto in 1992.95 Law school catalogues began to resemble an undergraduate course menu inspired and taught by an expanding collection of nonlaw doctorate faculty who came on board during the mid-eighties. Schuck notes that Yale has about 15 nonlaw Ph.Ds.96 My school has dual appointments in history, medicine, economics, and political science.
What happens when postmodern scholarship gets to the Promotion and Tenure Committee is a topic of some bewilderment. Rather than delaying nontraditional writing until they get tenure with obligatory doctrinal work, young faculty now want to get an early start on a postmodern career. There is a catch -how does the Committee pro ceed? What do they use for evaluative criteria? If they thought criti cal evaluation of doctrinal work was problematic, wait till they deal with narratives and other postmodern genres.97 Instead of trying to determine whether the article adds to the knowledge of the field, the evaluator can look for its transformative effects on the audience. The question is not whether the work solves a problem, but rather: Does it resonate? It is not the comprehensibility of the analysis and research but whether the author manifests a commitment to an oppressed group. The burden is on the evaluator "to discern the unifying threads of a nonlinear argument."98 Confronted with this formidable chal lenge, the prudent committee will opt to rely on "those they recognize as experts in the genre for theO assessment."99
